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Abstract
In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly
offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convinc-
ingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition
of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based
dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose pro-
tection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic govern-
ment’s antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where
the foreign firm’s cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the govern-
ment. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule,
contingent on firms’ cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional
information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is de-
tected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions,
the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information,
but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-
maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO
does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair
trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to
correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: F13, F16
Keywords:antidumping duties, asymmetric information, trade protection, strate-
gic trade policy
21. Introduction
Trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been an impressive success. Not
only have average tariff levels been lowered considerably, but additional product cat-
egories not included in previous trade liberalization agreements have also recently
become subject to the general liberalization process, e.g., agricultural products and
textiles. Yet, right from the beginning, trade liberalization under GATT was not
without exceptions. In fact, one major reason why the number of countries signing
off on the GATT increased so considerably was probably that the agreement con-
tained numerous provisions to allow participants to “withdraw – or cease to apply –
their normal obligations in order to protect (safeguard) certain overriding interests.”
(Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 303). One such exception provision that has proved
especially popular are antidumping measures. Article VI of GATT stipulates that
member countries can impose antidumping duties on products that are imported at
below-normal value (i.e., either below the price in the exporting-country or third-
country market or below production cost plus reasonable additions for sales cost and
profit) and cause material injury to a domestic industry. In this paper, we investigate
in how far antidumping may be (ab)used to conduct strategic trade policy.
During the first decades of the GATT, antidumping duties were used rather
infrequently. This changed with the completion of the GATT Tokyo Round in 1979,
when the antidumping statute was amended. First, the definition of selling below fair
or normal value was extended to include sales below cost; today, the “fair/normal
value” is more likely to be a value constructed from cost estimates and “reasonable”
additions rather than being an observable market price. Moreover, it was no longer
deemed necessary to prove that dumping was the principal cause of material injury
(Blonigen and Prusa, 2003). These changes eventually resulted in a veritable an-
tidumping “boom”. Whereas the successful completion of the Uruguay Round led to
considerable progress in bringing down average tariff rates and increasing the prod-
uct range to which trade liberalization applied, a parallel movement to increase trade
protection under the cloak of “fair trade” took place: From 1995 to 2006, the num-
ber of antidumping measures increased dramatically, reaching an all-time high with
227 antidumping measures reported by WTO members in 2000. In addition, the
3number of users increased dramatically as well, with developing countries starting to
add antidumping to their trade policy toolkit and India becoming the most frequent
antidumping user (WTO information as of January 2009).1
It has been well recognized by trade economists that “dumping” is a flexible
term and can be used rather arbitrarily to impede foreign competition in the domes-
tic market, thus creating a new protectionism under the auspices of GATT/WTO
(Blonigen and Prusa, 2003). In particular, the introduction of the cost-based dump-
ing definition during the GATT Tokyo Round has increased the discretionary leeway
for the antidumping authority to determine dumping and the dumping margin. For
example, Lindsey and Ikenson (2003) and Blonigen (2006) explain in some detail
how the existing rules can be abused to regularly find pricing below normal value
if this is politically desired. It thus seems reasonable to assume that antidumping
may be used to pursue strategic trade policy, given that antidumping is especially
prevalent in oligopolistic industries. According to the definition by Brander (1995,
p.1397), strategic trade policy is “trade policy that conditions or alters a strategic
relationship between firms”. Under oligopoly, the optimal trade policy is usually not
free trade due to a rent-shifting argument. However, calculating the size and even
the type of the optimal trade policy instrument is difficult because the government
typically does not possess the necessary market- and firm-specific information.
In this paper, we investigate how the domestic government, i.e., the antidump-
ing authority, can use the antidumping procedure for optimal mechanism design to
solicit the information necessary for calculating the optimal strategic trade policy.
To this purpose, we consider the market for a good in which a domestic firm and a
foreign firm operate and assume that the optimal strategic trade policy under perfect
information would be an import tariff2 which raises domestic profit and tariff revenue
at the expense of domestic consumers and the foreign firm’s profit. To calculate the
optimal strategic import tariff, the domestic government needs information about the
foreign firm’s cost. In our model, we assume that the domestic government a priori
does not have this cost information, but the analysis also readily carries over to the
1http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm#statistics
2For conditions, see, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1984), Dixit (1984), and Helpman and Krugman
(1989).
4case that other market or firm-level information is known to the firms, but not to
the authorities, e.g., demand information. Since the government does not have the
cost information, but the foreign firm and maybe even the domestic firm does, it
makes sense to consider the question of optimal antidumping duties in an asymmet-
ric information framework. In particular, we discuss how the domestic antidumping
authority can design an optimal mechanism to obtain the foreign cost information,
using antidumping duties and audits as instruments.
The topic of antidumping under asymmetric information is not completely
novel to the literature. Kohler and Moore (2001) also model auditing during an an-
tidumping investigation, but they assume perfect competition, and the asymmetric
information in their paper is about domestic cost and whether or not material in-
jury has occurred. In their context, the domestic government is not interested in
active trade policy per se, but has to employ a tariff in case the domestic industry
is truly injured by foreign competition. In our paper, in contrast, the government
uses antidumping as a convenient means to pursue strategic trade policy. Our paper
is probably most closely related to Cheng, Qiu, and Wong (2001) who also consider
antidumping as a type of strategic trade policy. Our paper is different from theirs,
however, with regard to the instruments at the authority’s disposal. Cheng et al.
(2001) allow for lump sum payments to firms, whereas we, in line with reality, do not
allow such payments as an instrument to extract the true cost information.3 Instead,
the authority can use the antidumping duties and the threat of audits at the foreign
firm’s premises, which are allowed according to GATT/WTO rules, to find out about
foreign cost.
We show that in general, the instruments available to the domestic authority in
the course of an antidumping investigation are fully sufficient to obtain the correct cost
information. Moreover, under certain assumptions, the domestic government does not
3Payments from firms to the antidumping authority would be viewed as attempted bribery and are
thus not allowed. Payments from the authority to firms are considered as trade-distorting subsidies
forbidden under the WTO. For example, the Byrd amendment, that distributed antidumping revenue
to petitioning firms in the U.S., was ruled in violation with WTO rules in 2003 and had to be
scrapped.
5only extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-
information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping
framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic
trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational
problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy. This
formerly ignored aspect of antidumping may make antidumping more attractive for
governments eager to employ strategic trade policy and may thus pose a greater
danger to trade liberalization than previously thought.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we set forth
the theoretical model framework. In sections 3, 4, and 5, we discuss the solution
to the government’s mechanism design problem under varying assumptions about
how much leeway GATT/WTO regulations provide with respect to the duty choice,
but maintaining the assumption that auditing is perfect and antidumping duties
and auditing probabilities are contractible. In section 6, we discuss in how far the
presented solutions are feasible when contractibility does not hold, and in section
7 we investigate the consequences of an imperfect auditing technology. Section 8
concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a country with two firms, one domestic and one foreign, in the market
for a good. The foreign firm has constant marginal cost c. The realization of this
cost parameter is known to both firms,4 but the government/domestic antidumping
authority only knows that c equals c with probability α and c¯ with probability 1−α,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and c < c¯. Apart from the foreign cost information, the information
sets of authority and firms are identical.
We analyze the interaction between the antidumping authority and the two
firms in one given period. We assume that, in the previous period, a certain price p0
for the foreign good was observed and is now the object (the alleged below fair value
price) of the dumping investigation. According to the cost-based dumping definition,
dumping has occurred if p0 lies below the foreign firm’s marginal cost c. The dumping
4Section 5 also covers the case when only the foreign firm knows c.
6margin (abstracting from sales and profit surcharges to the cost parameter) is m(c) =
max{c − p0, 0}. The realization of c cannot be inferred from the price observation,
possibly because of a random element in the price (we provide an example below). The
domestic firm has filed a dumping complaint with the domestic authority, contending
that the foreign firm has sold its products below cost. The domestic firm’s goal is to
receive protection in form of an antidumping duty t and increase its expected profit
Πd(c, t) which is strictly increasing in t as long as t ≤ t0(c) where t0(c) is the tariff
at which the foreign firm’s expected profit becomes 0. Similarly, the foreign firm’s
expected profit Πf (c, t) is strictly decreasing in t for t ≤ t0(c).
The domestic authority uses the antidumping framework for strategic trade
policy purposes, i.e., it wishes to maximize an objective (welfare) function W (c, t)
which is strictly concave in t, for example the expectation of consumer surplus, do-
mestic profit, and tariff revenue conditional on c, or a weighted sum thereof. As
a benchmark, denote by t∗(c) the tariff that maximizes W (c, t). We are going to
call this tariff the full-information optimal tariff. It is the tariff that the authority
would implement if the information sets of authority and firms were equal (i.e., all
parties know c, but it is still possible that some other variables as, e.g., demand, are
random as long as everybody has the same distributional information). We assume
throughout that t∗(c) > 0. Furthermore, we restrict attention to t∗(c) being strictly
decreasing in c, i.e. ∂
2W
∂t∂c
< 0, in order to reduce the number of cases that need to
be discussed. The analysis for the case that t∗(c) is increasing in c can be conducted
analogously.
Throughout, we are going to further illustrate our general findings by means
of a simple example with linear market demand which is described below.
Example 2.1. Let the market demand for a homogeneous good be linear of the form
Q = a˜ − p where Q is total output defined as sum of domestic firm’s output qd
and foreign firm’s output qf and a˜ = a +  is subject to a random shock  which is
distributed with probability density function f and an expected value of 0. Let the
domestic firm’s marginal cost be k. Firms compete Cournot style and set quantities
before the realization of a˜. Hence, the Cournot-Nash quantities are non-random and
given by qd = (a + c + t − 2k)/3 for the domestic firm and qf = (a + k − 2c − 2t)/3
7for the foreign firm, leading to a market price of p = (a + k + c + t)/3 + . If  is
sufficiently negative, it is thus indeed possible that the equilibrium price lies below the
foreign firm’s marginal cost c, leading to unintentional or cyclical dumping according
to the cost-based dumping definition (Cheng et al., 2001).5 Assume the authority
maximizes domestic welfare defined as sum of expected consumer surplus, expected
domestic firm’s profit, and tariff revenue, i.e.,
W (c, t) = V (c, t) + Πd(c, t) + T (c, t) (2.1)
where V =
∫
(a˜− p)Q/2fd = (2a − k − c − t)2/18 denotes expected consumer
surplus, Πd =
∫
(p− k)qdfd = (a − 2k + c + t)2/9 the expected domestic profit,
and T = tqf = t(a + k − 2c − 2t)/3 the tariff revenue under Cournot duopoly. The
full-information optimal tariff6 that maximizes (2.1) is then given by t∗(c) = (a−c)/3
and is thus decreasing in c.7
However, in line with reality, we assume that the authority does not a priori
have perfect information about foreign cost. Moreover, in the real world, trade policy
choices may be restricted under GATT/WTO. Therefore, to find out the foreign cost
parameter c, the authority uses an antidumping procedure which is designed to com-
ply with GATT/WTO regulations. The antidumping investigation is initiated by the
home firm’s filing a dumping complaint and providing information about the alleged
dumping. More specifically, we assume that the domestic firm provides information
about the foreign firm’s cost parameter c. Once the petition has passed a preliminary
plausibility check, the authority is required to investigate the allegations according to
5Since the domestic authority uses antidumping for strategic trade policy purposes rather than
to counter deliberate dumping, whether or not dumping was intended is not of importance.
6Our situation where a domestic government uses a tariff to strategically alter the interaction
between a domestic and a foreign firm in the domestic market should not be confused with a model
where a government wants to shift profits from a foreign firm to a domestic exporter in a third-
country Cournot duopoly market (Brander and Spencer, 1985). In this latter case, the optimal
strategic trade policy would be an export subsidy.
7If, however, the antidumping authority maximizes a weighted sum of consumer surplus and tariff
revenue on the one hand and domestic profit on the other hand, t∗(c) is strictly increasing in c if the
weight β on the domestic profit lies between 5/2 and 11/2. If β is even higher, the authority would
want to set a prohibitive tariff.
8article 5 of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement (GATT, 1994). An integral
part of these investigations consists of having the foreign firm fill out a detailed ques-
tionnaire, which, for the purposes of our model, we interpret as asking the foreign
firm for its cost information. According to article 6.7 of the Antidumping Agreement
(GATT, 1994), “in order to verify information provided or to obtain further details,
the authorities may carry on investigations in the territory of other members as re-
quired, provided they obtain the agreement of the firms concerned”. Such an audit
at the foreign firm’s premises causes a cost M > 0 for the authority. For now, we
assume that such an audit always reveals the true cost parameter (perfect auditing).
The case of imperfect auditing is analyzed in section 7.
The auditing probability θ(cd, cf ) itself is contingent on the cost reports cd
and cf by the domestic and the foreign firm, respectively. Complementing the audit
probability, the authority can use the antidumping duty itself as instrument. In
the following, we denote by t(cd, cf ) the antidumping duty (“normal tariff”) that is
imposed when the cost reports are cd and cf , respectively, and no audit has taken
place, and by t˜(cd, cf |c) the antidumping duty (“punishment tariff”) that is imposed
when the cost reports are cd and cf and an audit is conducted that reveals that the
true cost parameter equals c. We assume that t˜(c, c|c) = t(c, c), i.e., if an audit
shows that both firms have reported truthfully, the normal tariff rate applies. The
tariff functions and auditing probabilities might need to be chosen to meet certain
regulations, e.g., tariffs might have to be at or below the dumping margin m(c). We
allow for different possibilities in this respect, discussed in more detail below.
Without an incentive-compatible mechanism in place, the domestic firm will
report cd such that the maximum tariff is obtained and the foreign firm will report cf
such that the minimum tariff is obtained. We show that, depending on the concrete
assumptions, the authority may take advantage of this conflict of interests and may
design a mechanism that does not only lead to the truthful revelation of c, but also
to the implementation of the full-information optimal tariff t∗(c).
Initially, we assume that tariffs and auditing probabilities are contractible. In
this case, timing is as follows. First, the foreign firm’s price p0 of the last period is
observed by everyone. Then, the authority commits to the tariff schedules t(cd, cf ),
9t˜(cd, cf |c) and auditing probabilities θ(cd, cf ). Afterwards, the domestic firm decides
whether to file an antidumping petition, which includes its cost report cd. In case
a petition arrives, the authority asks the foreign firm to hand in its cost report cf .
The authority then audits with probability θ(cd, cf ) and implements antidumping
measures according to the ex-ante announced schemes. Finally, firms set their decision
variables (i.e., choose production quantities in the example), followed by the resolution
of uncertainty (i.e., the realization of the demand shock in the example).
However, contractibility of tariff schemes and auditing probabilities might not
always be given. In particular, the contractibility of auditing may be a strong as-
sumption since compliance with an auditing scheme is particularly difficult to verify.8
This is problematic if the ex-ante announced tariff schemes and auditing probabilities
are not optimal ex-post, i.e., once the authority is informed about the foreign firm’s
cost. Then, the authority would want to deviate from its ex-ante announcements.
We therefore discuss the implications of non-contractibility in section 6.
In how far the real existing dumping margin may constitute an upper bound
for antidumping duties and thus strategic trade policy is debatable. The idea of maxi-
mum discretion is reflected in works such as Kolev and Prusa (2002) where an optimal
antidumping duty can be set regardless of whether dumping has actually occurred.
Others, such as Cheng et al. (2001), assume that the real existing dumping margin
is indeed the upper bound for any antidumping duty. When looking at this question
from a contract theory perspective, the level of discretion that the antidumping au-
thority has when imposing an antidumping duty actually depends on the degree to
which the cost parameter is verifiable by a third party, i.e. an independent court. We
distinguish between three cases. In case 1, c is non-verifiable and the authority is thus
completely free in designing an antidumping procedure and implementing any arbi-
trary tariff. By contrast, in case 2, c is verifiable so that the authority cannot choose
tariffs that are above the true dumping margin. Case 3 lies in-between the previous
two. In this case, c is not verifiable, but the authority needs to provide some proof of
the realization of c, such as a firm’s report, to defend its choice of antidumping duty.
8Even if inspectors arrive at the foreign firm’s premises, it is hard to verify how much effort they
put into the investigation.
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In this case, it can implement all tariffs that are below or at the maximum dumping
margin reported by either the domestic or the foreign firm.
In the following, we will demonstrate how the authority can take advantage
of the antidumping procedure and induce the firms to share the information about
foreign cost. We will also discuss whether the antidumping duties will equal the
full-information tariffs.
3. Case 1: Complete freedom of designing an antidumping mechanism
In this section, we assume that the authority has complete freedom in choos-
ing the tariff schedule and the auditing probabilities. In particular, after using the
antidumping procedure as a pretext to find out the cost parameter c, the authority
is not bound by the actual dumping margin when deciding on a tariff. This will
be the case if the true cost parameter c cannot be verified by an independent third
party.9 Then, the authority can distort the obtained information in such a way as
to construct a dumping margin according to its liking, and this distortion cannot be
proven in an independent investigation. This is clearly a strong assumption and will
be dropped in the next sections, but seems a good starting point given the diverging
views on how much discretion the antidumping authority really has in determining
the dumping margin.
We assume that the authority wishes to induce truthful reporting of the for-
eign firm’s cost parameter by both firms. Afterwards, we will see that doing so is
indeed optimal from the authority’s point of view. We implement truth-telling as
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The authority thus chooses tariffs t(cd, cf ) and
t˜(cd, cf |c) as well as auditing probabilities θ(cd, cf ) to maximize the expectation of
welfare W (c, t(c, c)) minus auditing cost M
α[W (c¯, t(c¯, c¯))− θ(c¯, c¯)M ] + (1− α)[W (c, t(c, c))− θ(c, c)M ], (3.1)
subject to the constraints that for every c, c˜ ∈ {c, c¯} and c˜ 6= c we have
Πd(c, t(c, c)) ≥ [1− θ(c˜, c)]Πd(c, t(c˜, c)) + θ(c˜, c)Πd(c, t˜(c˜, c|c)), (3.2)
9Or, equivalently, the foreign firm has no means to enforce a tariff below the actual dumping
margin.
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Πf (c, t(c, c)) ≥ [1− θ(c, c˜)]Πf (c, t(c, c˜)) + θ(c, c˜)Πf (c, t˜(c, c˜|c)). (3.3)
The first set of constraints (3.2) are the incentive compatibility constraints
for truthful reporting by the domestic firm. They state that, given that the for-
eign firm makes a truthful report, the domestic firm must also prefer to tell the truth.
Truthtelling yields the expected profit Πd(c, t(c, c)). Lying entails an audit with prob-
ability θ(c˜, c). The audit reveals misreporting by the domestic firm and leads to the
tariff t˜(c˜, c|c). If in spite of diverging reports the authority does not audit, the tariff
is t(c˜, c). Similarly, the second set of constraints (3.3) are the incentive compatibility
constraints for the foreign firm. We omit the participation constraints for the firms
because in our model, they are very easy to satisfy since a non-reporting firm can be
punished by a sufficiently high (for the foreign firm) or sufficiently low tariff (for the
domestic firm): The authority can always ensure the foreign firm’s participation by
punishing non-participation with a tariff that is weakly higher than the tariff t(c, c).
Similarly, the domestic firm’s participation constraint is unproblematic: The domes-
tic firm always (weakly) benefits from initiating an antidumping investigation since
the implemented tariff will be non-negative.10 To simplify the discussion, we assume
that whenever any of the incentive compatibility constraints bind, a firm will choose
truth-telling over lying.11
To solve the authority’s optimization problem, first note that all constraints
are easily satisfied by the following auditing and tariff scheme. The authority audits
if and only if reports do not coincide, i.e., θ(cd, cf ) = 1 if cd 6= cf and θ(cd, cf ) = 0
if cd = cf . The normal tariffs are set equal to the perfect-information tariffs when
reports are identical, i.e., t(cd, cf ) = t
∗(cd) = t∗(cf ) if cd = cf . Finally, punishment
tariffs for a lying domestic firm are weakly lower and those for a lying foreign firm
10We are abstracting from participation costs here. Of course, writing an antidumping petition
is costly for the domestic firm. Similarly, providing all the information requested in an antidumping
investigation entails cost for the foreign firm. If the domestic firm does not file a complaint, how-
ever, an antidumping investigation will not take place, so it makes sense in our analysis to assume
that the domestic firm’s participation constraint is fulfilled. For an empirical investigation on the
determinants of foreign firm cooperation in antidumping investigations, see Moore and Fox (2007).
11This simplifying assumption avoids cumbersome discussions of multiple equilibria in case that
the punishment tariffs cannot differ from the normal tariffs.
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are weakly higher than the normal tariff rates, i.e., t˜(cd, c|c) ≤ t∗(c) if cd 6= c and
t˜(c, cf |c) ≥ t∗(c) if cf 6= c. In anticipation of a possible commitment problem on the
side of the authority under non-contractibility of tariff schemes, we set the punishment
tariffs equal to the normal tariff levels t∗(c). Then, the implementation of punishment
tariffs is credible even if they are not contractible, because they are ex-post optimal
from the authority’s point of view.
Given these auditing probabilities and tariffs, truthful reporting of both firms
constitutes an equilibrium. It does not pay for either firm to misreport cost because
if it does so unilaterally, an audit will uncover the lie for sure and no tariff advantages
can be gained by misreporting. Consequently, identical reports arrive in equilibrium,
and the authority does not need to incur any auditing costs. In addition, the perfect-
information tariffs t∗(c) are implemented. Thus, the proposed combination of tariffs
and auditing probabilities is optimal from the authority’s point of view. For fur-
ther reference, we call this approach mechanism A. We summarize our results in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the case where the actual dumping margin does not limit
the authority’s choice of antidumping duty. The following incentive-compatible mech-
anism A is optimal from the authority’s perspective: If cd = cf , the auditing probability
is θA(cd, cf ) = 0 and the antidumping duty is tA(cd, cf ) = t
∗(cd) = t∗(cf ). If cd 6= cf ,
θA(cd, cf ) = 1 and t˜A(cd, cf |c) = t∗(c).
In equilibrium, both firms report truthfully and the full-information tariffs t∗(c)
will be implemented; moreover, auditing never takes place and hence does not cause
any costs. Governmental welfare is thus given by W (c, t∗(c)), i.e., equals welfare
under perfect information.
Example 3.1. In our example, mechanism A consists of normal tariffs tA(c, c) = (a−
c)/3, punishment tariffs t˜A(c, c˜|c) = t˜A(c˜, c|c) = (a − c)/3 and auditing probabilities
θA(cd, cf ) = 0 if cd = cf and θA(cd, cf ) = 1 otherwise.
4. Case 2: Tariffs at or below the true dumping margin
In this section, we turn to the counterpart of case 1. We now assume that
the true cost parameter c is verifiable by an independent third party. This implies
13
that the authority cannot conceal, distort, or misinterpret the information obtained
during the antidumping investigation. Thus, whenever the authority tries to impose a
tariff exceeding the dumping margin, the foreign firm will successfully sue for a lower
tariff rate.12 Consequently, the actual dumping margin places an upper bound on the
attainable antidumping duty since according to GATT/WTO, the authority cannot
set antidumping duties beyond the dumping margin m(c) = max{0, c − p0}. Hence,
we define the constrained optimal antidumping duty as t∗m(c) := min{t∗(c),m(c)}.
Concerning the auditing procedure, we retain the assumption that the authority is
free to choose the auditing probabilities θ(cd, cf ).
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Analogously to case 1, we start the analysis under the assumption that the
authority wishes to induce both firms to tell the truth, which will then prove to be
the optimal approach. The authority’s optimization problem is also very similar to
the one in case 1. The authority again maximizes the objective function (3.1) under
the incentive compatibility constraints (3.2) and (3.3). In addition, it has to take into
account the constraint that none of the tariffs may lie above the dumping margin.
That is, for every cd, cf , and c,
m(c) ≥ t(c, c), m(c) ≥ t˜(c, cf |c), m(c) ≥ t˜(cd, c|c).
As under mechanism A, the authority audits if and only if firms’ reports differ.
After the audit has revealed the true cost parameter c, the authority implements
the constrained optimal antidumping duty t∗m(c) defined as min{t∗(c),m(c)}, i.e.,
t˜(cd, c|c) = t˜(c, cf |c) = t∗m(c) for cd 6= c and cf 6= c. If firms make identical reports
cd = cf , the tariff is t
∗
m(cd). All these tariffs are ex post optimal and thus credible
even when they are not contractible. We call this scheme of tariffs and auditing
probabilities mechanism B. Mechanism B and its outcome are summarized in the
following proposition.
12In practice, it will usually be costly for the foreign firm to enforce an investigation. We assume
that these costs are not so large that the firm refrains from defending its case.
13Alternatively, we could assume that the authority is obliged to conduct an audit whenever
firms’ reports do not coincide. Given the situation analyzed in this section, namely, a complete
transparency of the antidumping investigation, compliance with such an obligation would be en-
forceable. However, as we will see shortly, it will be part of the authority’s optimal strategy to
always audit in case of diverging reports anyway.
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Proposition 4.1. If the foreign firm’s marginal costs are verifiable, the following
mechanism B is optimal from the authority’s perspective: If cd = cf , the auditing





If cd 6= cf , θB(cd, cf ) = 1 and t˜B(cd, cf |c) = t∗m(c).
In equilibrium, both firms report truthfully, the authority implements t∗m(c), and
an audit never takes place. Furthermore, governmental welfare is equal to W (c, t∗m(c)),
i.e., the maximum welfare under perfect information, given the constraint on the tariff.
Example 4.1. In our example, the mechanism B consists of normal tariffs tB(c, c) =
min{(a−c)/3,m(c)}, punishment tariffs t˜B(c, c˜|c) = t˜B(c˜, c|c) = min{(a−c)/3,m(c)}
and auditing probabilities θB(cd, cf ) = 0 if cd = cf and θB(cd, cf ) = 1 otherwise.
5. Case 3: Tariffs at or below the maximum reported dumping margin
In this section, we consider a case that lies in-between the previous cases 1
and 2. We now assume that, as in case 1, the true cost parameter c is non-verifiable.
However, contrary to case 1, the authority must not disregard firms’ reports when
deciding on the tariff. In particular, the authority is allowed to implement only tariffs
not exceeding the maximum dumping margin reported by the two firms, i.e., the tariff
must be smaller or equal max{cd − p0, cf − p0, 0}. In actual antidumping cases, such
a procedure where the assumed dumping margin is equal to max{cd − p0, cf − p0, 0}
is also known as “adverse facts available” and has been used by U.S. antidumping
authorities when the cooperation by the foreign firm has been deemed unsatisfactory.
As in the foregoing sections, the authority is free to implement any arbitrary auditing
procedure. This seems reasonable given the assumption that the outcome of an audit,
the true cost parameter c, cannot be verified anyway.
Under these assumptions, mechanism B, which is optimal in case 2, remains
feasible. When applying mechanism B, the authority induces both firms to report
truthfully. Then, the maximum reported dumping margin equals the true dumping
margin and the authority imposes the tariff t∗m(c). However, as we will show below,
the authority might be able to do better by inducing firms to report in a way that
allows to impose tariffs above the actual dumping margin m(c). This is achieved by
exploiting the domestic firm’s interest in a high tariff to obtain maximum leeway in
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setting the antidumping duty, while using the foreign firm’s report to obtain truthful
cost information. Note that, contrary to the previous sections, for this approach we
do not have to assume that the domestic firm actually knows the foreign firm’s cost
parameter, since truthful cost information is provided by the foreign firm only. In the
following subsection, we analyze this mechanism, denoted mechanism C, in detail.
Afterwards, we discuss under which circumstances the authority prefers mechanism
C to mechanism B.
5.1. Truthful reporting by the foreign firm only. Under mechanism C, the
authority announces normal tariffs t(cf ), punishment tariffs t˜(cf |c) as well as auditing
probabilities θ(cf ) contingent on the foreign firm’s report only. Consequently, the
domestic firm’s report affects the outcome of the antidumping investigation only
through its impact on the maximum reported dumping margin. By submitting a high
cost report, the domestic firm (weakly) increases the maximum reported dumping
margin and, potentially, also the implemented tariff. Thus, the domestic firm reports
cd = c¯. The maximum reported dumping margin and hence also the maximally
allowed duty is thus tmax = c¯ − p0. For the model to be interesting, we need that
t∗(c) < tmax for at least one of the c realizations. Otherwise it would be clear that the
optimal policy is to always implement tmax. In the following, we restrict attention to
the case t∗(c) < tmax for all c.14
The tariffs and auditing probabilities are chosen to maximize the expectation
of welfare W (c, t(c)) minus the expected cost of auditing
α[W (c¯, t(c¯))− θ(c¯)M ] + (1− α)[W (c, t(c))− θ(c)M ], (5.1)
subject to the constraints that for all c, c˜ with c 6= c˜
Πf (c, t(c)) ≥ [1− θ(c˜)]Πf (c, t(c˜)) + θ(c˜)Πf (c, t˜(c˜|c)), (5.2)
and tmax ≥ t(c), t(c˜), t˜(c˜|c).
Once again, we do not explicitly consider the foreign firm’s participation con-
straint since it can be easily fulfilled by choosing an antidumping duty tmax in case
the foreign firm refuses to provide a report (“adverse facts available”). Furthermore,
14The analysis of the general case where t∗(c) < tmax for at least one c is very similar, except we
would also have to discuss corner solutions.
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in order to satisfy the foreign firm’s incentive compatibility constraints (5.2), the au-
thority cannot do better than choosing the maximum attainable tariff to punish the
foreign firm in case lying has been detected, that is t˜(cf |c) = tmax if cf 6= c is found
in an audit. To simplify notation, we define
t¯ := t(c¯), t := t(c), θ¯ := θ(c¯), θ := θ(c). (5.3)
The authority’s optimization problem can then be reduced to
max
t¯,t,θ¯,θ
α[W (c¯, t¯)− θ¯M ] + (1− α)[W (c, t)− θM ],
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
Πf (c¯, t¯) ≥ [1− θ]Πf (c¯, t) + θΠf (c¯, tmax), (5.4)
Πf (c, t) ≥ [1− θ¯]Πf (c, t¯) + θ¯Πf (c, tmax), (5.5)
and tmax ≥ t¯, t.
Intuitively, to obtain truth-telling, we need to balance lying incentives from
differences in tariff rates for different cost types with differences in auditing probabil-
ities. We will see that lower tariffs are accompanied by higher auditing probabilities
and thus higher expected profit losses for an untruthful firm.
To solve the authority’s problem, remember that we have assumed that t∗(c)
is decreasing in c, hence the authority is only interested in implementing tariff rates
t(c) that are also decreasing in c.15
From the above, we know that t¯ < t ≤ tmax.16 Since the foreign firm prefers the
low to the high tariff, we can immediately conclude that the high-cost type’s incentive
compatibility constraint (5.4) is satisfied for all auditing probabilities θ. Therefore,
we can drop this constraint and set θ = 0. The simplified problem is
max
t¯,t,θ¯
α[W (c¯, t¯)− θ¯M ] + (1− α)W (c, t), (5.6)
15We prove this statement in the appendix.
16The case t¯ = t is trivial because then the authority would not audit and always implement the
tariff rate tave that maximizes αW (c¯, t)+(1−α)W (c, t). This case is optimal if the functional forms
are such that the implementation of tariffs marginally below and above tave increases the authority’s
expected auditing costs more strongly than expected welfare.
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subject to
Πf (c, t) ≥ [1− θ¯]Πf (c, t¯) + θ¯Πf (c, tmax), (5.7)
and tmax ≥ t.
For any pair of tariffs (t¯, t), the remaining incentive compatibility constraint
(5.7) must be binding. Otherwise, the authority could lower θ¯, thereby saving auditing
costs. From the binding constraint (5.7), we obtain the optimal auditing probability
for a given tariff scheme (t¯, t),
θ¯(t¯, t) =
Πf (c, t¯)− Πf (c, t)
Πf (c, t¯)− Πf (c, tmax) . (5.8)
This auditing probability lies between 0 and 1 as required for a probability. It is
the higher the higher t and the lower t¯. Intuitively, the larger the difference between
tariffs, the stronger is the low-cost type’s incentive to lie. Stronger incentives to lie
must be counteracted by a higher auditing probability.
The antidumping authority’s maximization problem can now be rewritten as
max
t¯,t
α[W (c¯, t¯)− θ¯(t¯, t)M ] + (1− α)W (c, t), s.t. tmax ≥ t,
where θ¯(t¯, t) is given by (5.8). For the moment, we disregard the constraint tmax ≥ t.
Then, provided that the objective function is strictly concave in t, the optimal tariffs














(t¯C , tC)M. (5.10)
We show in the appendix that these conditions indeed characterize the optimal tariffs
and, furthermore, that the tariffs lie between the perfect information tariffs, i.e.,
t∗(c¯) < tC(c¯) < tC(c) < t∗(c). Intuitively, the larger the gap between the low- and the
high-cost tariff, t− t¯, the higher is the foreign firm’s incentive to deliver an untruthful
report if c = c. To sustain truthful revelation, the authority can therefore increase
t− t¯ only by raising the audit probability in case a high-cost report arrives. Trading
off the implementation of more favorable tariffs versus expected auditing cost, the
authority optimally chooses a tariff gap that is smaller than t∗(c)− t∗(c¯). Moreover,
the implemented tariff gap decreases in auditing costs M and in the probability of a
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high-cost realization, α. Intuitively, the higher the auditing cost, the more expensive it
is to implement a large tariff gap. Also, the higher the probability that the foreign firm
is a high-cost type, the more likely it is that a high-cost report arrives. Consequently,
auditing costs have to be incurred more often, thereby making a smaller tariff gap
optimal.
Proposition 5.1. Consider the case when c is non-verifiable and tariffs must not
exceed max{cf − p0, cd − p0, 0}. Assume further that t∗(c¯) < t∗(c). The optimal
equilibrium duties are implicitly defined by (5.9) and (5.10) and lie strictly between
the full information tariffs, namely t∗(c¯) < tC(c¯) ≤ tC(c) < t∗(c). If a high cost report
arrives, the authority audits with strictly positive probability θC(c¯) = θ¯(tC(c¯), tC(c))
given by (5.8), and if a low cost report arrives, the authority does not audit (θC(c) =
0).
Example 5.1. Consider our example for the case when c is non-verifiable and tariffs
must not exceed max{cf − p0, cd − p0, 0}. The auditing probability when the foreign
firm reports c¯ equals
θ¯(t¯C , tC) =
(tC − t¯C)(a+ k − 2c− t¯C − tC)
(tmax − t¯C)(a+ k − 2c− t¯C − tmax) (5.11)
where t¯C and tC are implicitly defined as solutions to
a− c¯− 3t¯C
3
= −M (tmax − tC)(a+ k − 2c− 2t¯C)(a+ k − 2c− tC − tmax)







a+ k − 2c− 2tC
(tmax − t¯C)(a+ k − 2c− t¯C − tmax) . (5.13)
For example, let a = 100, c = 10, c¯ = 50, k = 50, M = 10, tmax = 40 and α = 0.1.
The full-information tariffs are t¯∗ = 16.667 and t∗ = 30, whereas the optimal tariffs
under mechanism C are t¯C = 16.870 and tC = 29.954. The corresponding optimal
auditing probability in case a high-cost report arrives is θ¯ = 0.643.
5.2. Comparison of the mechanisms. We now discuss under which circumstances
the authority prefers mechanism B to mechanism C in case 3. A comparison of the
mechanisms is meaningful only if both firms are informed about the foreign firm’s
marginal cost, since only then mechanism B is feasible. The general trade-off is as
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follows. Mechanism B has the advantage that the authority does not incur auditing
cost. However, since both firms are made to report the foreign firm’s cost truthfully,
only tariffs at or below the true dumping margin can be implemented. Under mech-
anism C, by inducing differing reports, the authority may be able to circumvent the
dumping margin constraint. However, to do so, it has to incur positive expected audit
costs. To lower these costs, the authority distorts tariffs such that they always lie
in-between their perfect-information counterparts.
For example, consider the case that c − p0 < t∗(c¯) < t∗(c) < tmax = c¯ − p0.
Under mechanism B, since c− p0 < t∗(c), the implemented tariffs are t(c, c) = c− p0
and t(c¯, c¯) = t∗(c¯). Thus, the tariff in the low-cost case is too low compared to the
full-information tariff. Under mechanism C, the implemented tariff in the low-cost
case is too low, whereas the tariff is too high in the high-cost case. Moreover, an audit
will be conducted with strictly positive probability and hence auditing cost needs to
be incurred if c = c¯. We thus conclude that mechanism B will ceteris paribus be
preferred if the auditing cost M is high. To evaluate the effect of a higher probability
α of high cost, notice that under mechanism C, the probability of auditing and also
the distortion of tC compared to t
∗(c) are increasing in α. Moreover, under mechanism
B, the probability that the right (i.e., full-information) tariff will be chosen is higher,
hence the relative advantages of mechanism B are increasing in α.
6. Non-Contractible Auditing Probabilities and Tariff Schemes
In the previous sections, we assumed that auditing probabilities as well as
tariff schemes contingent on firms’ reports are contractible. Since these assumptions
may not always be realistic, we discuss the consequences of non-contractibility in this
section.
Contractibility of auditing probabilities requires that a third party be able to
verify whether the authority complied with an ex-ante announced random auditing
procedure. Clearly, this is difficult to accomplish in practice. Sometimes it may even
be difficult to assess whether an audit has been conducted at all. For example, even
if inspectors are present at the foreign firm’s premises, it is hard to verify how much
effort they put into the investigation. If auditing probabilities are non-verifiable,
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it is impossible for the authority to commit ex-ante to an auditing procedure by
contracting upon it. Moreover, any regulations provided by antidumping legislation
to conduct an audit in certain cases (e.g., if firms submitted conflicting reports) are
ineffective. The reason is that a third party cannot verify compliance with such a
regulation. Thus, the authority can commit to an auditing procedure only if it is
ex-post in its best interest to adhere to it.
Contractibility of tariff schemes appears to be easier to accomplish. In our
model, it only requires that firms’ reports and the subsequently implemented tariffs
be verifiable, which does not seem unrealistic. However, in the real world, firms
may not simply report the cost parameter but provide more diffuse information from
which the antidumping authority tries to deduce the true costs. Writing a complete
contract on this complex process may be impossible. Therefore, in what follows we
also discuss the case of non-contractible tariffs.
6.1. Case 1. First consider mechanism A specified in proposition 3.1, that is optimal
in case 1 if tariff and auditing schemes are contractible. As we have mentioned
before, tariff credibility is not an issue under this mechanism because the tariffs both
in and off the equilibrium path equal the unconstrained optimal tariffs under perfect
information. Hence, they are ex post optimal and thus ex ante credible. The auditing
probabilities, however, may not be self-enforcing. Mechanism A requires that the
authority conduct an audit whenever diverging reports cd 6= cf arrive. If auditing
probabilities are not contractible, the threat of audit is credible if and only if the
expected benefit from conducting an audit at least covers the authority’s auditing
costs, i.e.,




[αW (c¯, t) + (1− α)W (c, t)] (6.2)
maximizes expected welfare without any further information.
Under mechanism A, the authority audits with probability one when diverging
reports arrive. Clearly, there are other mechanisms with lower auditing probabilities
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that also induce truthtelling and prevent auditing in equilibrium.17 However, a lower
auditing probability does not mitigate the credibility problem. The reason is that the
threat of audits being self-enforcing does not depend on the ex-ante specified auditing
probability. To see this, assume that, in contrast to the previous considerations, the
authority announces an auditing probability θ(cd, cf ) < 1 for cd 6= cf . In this case,
if firms submit differing reports, a random procedure determines whether an audit
is to be conducted or not. Whenever this procedure requires an audit to occur, the
authority has an incentive to audit if and only if (6.1) is satisfied.
We summarize the preceding arguments in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. Consider the case when the authority can freely set the antidump-
ing duty. The tariffs specified in proposition 3.1 are credible even if they cannot
be contracted upon. Furthermore, the auditing probabilities are self-enforcing under
condition (6.1), i.e., provided that monitoring costs M are small and/or the ex-ante
available information about foreign cost is poor.
Intuitively, inequality (6.1) will be satisfied if implementing the average tariff
tave is only a bad compromise because the optimal tariffs t
∗(c¯) and t∗(c) are quite
different and uncertainty about the realized cost parameter is high.





a− αc¯− (1− α)c
3
. (6.3)




Thus, the threat of audit is more likely to be credible if α is close to 0.5 and c¯ − c
is large. Then, uncertainty about the foreign firm’s cost is high so that the authority
strongly benefits from finding out the true cost parameter and tailoring the tariff to the
actual situation. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, the authority is able to implement
efficient tariffs without any audits if the quality of ex-ante information about c is poor.
17With lower auditing probabilities, the authority has to impose more severe punishments for a
firm that has lied.
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If (6.1) does not hold, firms anticipate that there will never be an audit. Con-
sequently, under every non-constant tariff scheme, one firm always has an incentive to
lie about c. The authority is therefore not able to elicit information. Consequently,
there is no reason why the authority should take into account firms’ reports when
deciding on a tariff. After the domestic firm has filed the antidumping suit, the
authority either does not ask the foreign firm for a report, or, if this is legally infea-
sible, disregards the information provided by the foreign firm. The authority always
implements tave.
This approach can be interpreted as sticking to a “facts available” policy.
Blonigen (2006) shows that this option is chosen increasingly often. Condition (6.1)
suggests two possible explanations for this fact: (i) Because the number of dumping
suits has increased over time, authorities may suffer from work overload so that M is
high. As a consequence, they cannot credibly commit to a thorough audit. This in
turn implies that it is not worthwhile to pay attention to firms’ reports. Anticipating
that there will be no serious audit, firms lie anyway.18 (ii) Over time, authorities may
have become more experienced, i.e., they have better estimates about foreign firms’
costs. This would mean that tave comes relatively close to t
∗(c), so that the left-hand
side of (6.1) decreases.
6.2. Case 2. In case 2, the foreign firm’s marginal costs c are verifiable. As a con-
sequence, the authority is forced to impose a tariff at or below the actual dumping
margin. When analyzing case 2 in section 4, we have seen that the corresponding
optimal mechanism B is quite similar to the optimal mechanism A in case 1, the only
difference being that, instead of the optimal tariff scheme t∗(c), now the constrained
optimal tariffs t∗m(c) are implemented. Similarly to mechanism A, these tariffs are
ex-post optimal and thus self-enforcing.
However, due to the fact that c is verifiable, mechanism B differs from mecha-
nism A with respect to the consequences of a non-contractible auditing procedure. To
18This implies that, to implement efficient tariffs, the authority may want to have an “oversized”
agency dealing with dumping suits. In equilibrium, the agency’s employees would be idle, but this
signals that there exist sufficient resources to conduct audits. Or, in other words, the opportunity
costs of an audit are very low.
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see this, assume the authority does not conduct an audit when firms’ reports differ.
Consequently, the authority does not learn c and imposes a tariff tˆ that will, in gen-
eral, differ from t∗m(c). Then, since c can be verified in an independent investigation,
there will always be a party that has an interest in requesting such an investigation. If
tˆ < t∗m(c), the domestic firm wants to have an investigation. If tˆ > t
∗
m(c), the foreign
firm asks for a review. Hence, provided that enforcing a review is not too costly for
the firms, diverging reports always give rise to an investigation that reveals the true
cost parameter. Anticipating these consequences, no firm has an incentive to lie given
that the other firm tells the truth. Thus, even if the authority cannot commit to an
audit, the verifiable nature of c sustains the truth-telling equilibrium in case 2.
Proposition 6.2. Consider the case when c is verifiable. The tariffs specified for
mechanism B in proposition 4.1 are credible even if they cannot be contracted upon.
Furthermore, due to the verifiability of c, the truth-telling equilibrium can be sustained
even if auditing probabilities are non-contractible.
6.3. Case 3. In case 3, c cannot be verified by an independent third party. Thus,
the argumentation from case 2, that firms will always enforce the tariff t∗m(c), does
no longer apply under mechanism B. We therefore have to answer the question when
auditing is self-enforcing under this mechanism. Under mechanism B, it is ex-post in
the authority’s best interest to audit if and only if
α[W (c¯, t∗m(c¯))−W (c¯, tˆ)] + (1− α)[W (c, t∗m(c))−W (c, tˆ)] ≥M, (6.5)
where tˆ denotes the tariff that will be implemented if firms submit diverging reports
and no audit takes place. Since this tariff must not exceed the maximum reported
dumping margin, we obtain tˆ = min{tave, tmax}.
Now consider mechanism C. As we have seen in section 5, this mechanism
considerably differs from mechanism B. Under the latter, auditing is supposed to
occur only if firms’ reports differ. An audit then indeed improves the authority’s
information and, consequently, may be credible. By contrast, under mechanism C,
the authority must audit with positive probability even if it is clear that, due to the
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incentive compatibility of the mechanism, the report is truthful. Since there is no
immediate benefit from auditing, it is not self-enforcing.19
Furthermore, mechanism C specifies that the normal tariffs differ from the op-
timal perfect-information counterparts and that the punishment tariffs are maximal.
This implies that neither the normal nor the punishment tariffs are credible: Once
the cost report arrived, the authority would want to deviate from its announced tariff
to the perfect-information tariff. Moreover, the perfect-information tariff would also
be the optimal choice if ever an audit revealed that the foreign firm had lied.
Proposition 6.3. Consider the case when c is non-verifiable and tariffs must not
exceed max{cf − p0, cd− p0, 0}. Assume further that contractibility of tariff schedules
and auditing probabilities cannot be assumed. Under mechanism B, the tariffs speci-
fied in proposition 4.1 are self-enforcing. Furthermore, the auditing probabilities may
be self-enforcing as well under condition (6.5), i.e. provided that the ex-ante available
information about foreign cost is poor.
By contrast, mechanism C described in proposition 5.1 is not feasible because
the authority would ex-post not want to conduct audits, and it would also want to
deviate from the announced tariff schedule.
Now assume that (6.5) does not hold, implying that auditing under mecha-
nism B is not self-enforcing. In this case, auditing might still be worthwhile for the
authority if its tariff choice is not restricted by the actual dumping margin. That is,
the condition
α[W (c¯,min{t∗(c¯), tmax})−W (c¯,min{tave, tmax})]
+ (1− α)[W (c,min{t∗(c), tmax})−W (c,min{tave, tmax})] ≥M (6.6)
19Self-enforcement could be achieved in a repeated game if the authority cares about its reputation
in future dumping suits (possibly involving other firms if they can observe the authority’s behavior).
If this is the case and the discounted expected benefit from sustaining a reputation for conducting
audits exceeds M , the threat of audit is credible. However, the analysis of a repeated game structure
is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
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may still hold. As a consequence, the authority may find it useful to employ the
following approach D. Under this approach, the authority neither announces a tar-
iff scheme nor auditing probabilities so that no credibility problem arises. Timing
is as follows. First, the domestic firm hands in its cost report together with the
antidumping suit. Afterwards, the foreign firm may hand in a report. Then, the
authority decides whether to audit or not and, finally, implements a tariff at or below
max{cf − p0, cd − p0, 0}.
Given this procedure, the domestic firm will again report cost c¯ to give the
authority maximum discretion for its tariff choice. The foreign firm is indifferent be-
tween all reports and non-participation because its report does not influence the tariff
choice. If the authority audits, it learns c and implements the tariff min{t∗(c), tmax}.
Thus, the authority audits if and only if inequality (6.6) holds.20 Welfare is then
W (c,min{t∗(c), tmax}). Otherwise, there will be no audit, implying a welfare of
W (c,min{tave, tmax}).21 The latter case is similar to the “facts available” policy that
is applied in case 1 if auditing is not self-enforcing. The only difference is that, in case
1, the authority is not restricted in its tariff choice and can hence always implement
tave.
The authority applies approach D whenever (6.5) does not hold. Moreover,
even if auditing is self-enforcing under scheme B, the authority may prefer approach
D. To see this, suppose condition (6.5) is satisfied. This implies that (6.6) is also
satisfied and hence the authority audits under approach D. The authority then prefers
approach D to mechanism B if the benefit from implementing min{t∗(c), tmax} instead
of t∗m(c) outweighs the auditing costs.
20Note that it is necessary for this condition to hold that t∗(c) < tmax for at least one c. Otherwise,
the left-hand side equals zero.
21Note that, with contractibility of tariff and auditing schemes, both the auditing and the no-
auditing case are equivalent to a feasible solution to the authority’s optimization problem in case 3.
(The authority either announces an auditing probability of one and the implementation of t(cf ) =
min{t∗(cf ), tmax}, or the constant tariff t(cf ) = min{tave, tmax} and an auditing probability of
zero.) However, these solutions are (weakly) dominated by mechanism C. Thus, there was no need
to consider approach D before.
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7. Imperfect Auditing
Thus far, we have assumed that auditing is perfect in the sense that conducting
an audit always reveals the foreign firm’s true marginal cost. In this section, we extend
our model to a situation where auditing is imperfect, but return to the assumption
that tariff and auditing schemes are contractible. We model imperfectness of the
auditing procedure as follows: If a firm has lied and the authority audits, it detects
lying with probability τ , where 0 < τ < 1. (The case τ = 1 corresponds to perfect
auditing. If τ = 0, the authority’s auditing technology is completely ineffective and
it is therefore impossible to design an incentive-compatible mechanism using audits.)
With probability 1− τ , the authority does not uncover a wrongful report.
We first analyze the consequences of an imperfect auditing technology on the
optimal mechanism in case 1, where the authority has complete freedom to set the
antidumping duty. The authority, by choice of t(cd, cf ), t˜(cd, cf |c), and θ(cd, cf ), now
maximizes
α[W (c¯, t(c¯, c¯))− θ(c¯, c¯)M ] + (1− α)[W (c, t(c, c))− θ(c, c)M ],
subject to the constraints that, for every c, c˜ ∈ {c, c¯} and c˜ 6= c, we have
Πd(c, t(c, c)) ≥ [1− τθ(c˜, c)]Πd(c, t(c˜, c)) + τθ(c˜, c)Πd(c, t˜(c˜, c|c)) (7.1)
and
Πf (c, t(c, c)) ≥ [1− τθ(c, c˜)]Πf (c, t(c, c˜)) + τθ(c, c˜)Πf (c, t˜(c, c˜|c)), (7.2)
where participation constraints are once again omitted since they do not pose any
problem. First note that it cannot be optimal to audit with positive probability
when identical reports arrive because this would lead to positive auditing costs for
the authority without helping with the incentive compatibility constraints. Hence, we
must have θ(c, c) = 0. However, compared to the case of perfect auditing, ensuring
incentive compatibility is now more difficult. This is due to the fact that, even if
the authority always audits if firms’ reports are inconsistent, the lying firm remains
undetected with positive probability 1− τ .
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Assume again that t∗(c¯) < t∗(c) (the opposite case can be solved analogously).
We want to determine the minimum value of τ , denoted τmin, for which the full-
information tariffs t∗(c) are still implementable. To this end, we consider the follow-
ing mechanism, which is designed such that the right-hand sides of firms’ incentive
compatibility constraints (7.1) and (7.2) become as small as possible: The authority
sets θ(cd, cf ) = 1 whenever cd 6= cf . Furthermore, it chooses t˜(c, c˜|c) = t0(c). That
is, if an audit detects that the foreign firm has lied, the tariff will be such that the
foreign firm leaves the market. By contrast, when an audit detects that the domestic
firm has lied, the tariff will be t˜(c˜, c|c) = 0.
The incentive compatibility constraints can then be written as
Πd(c¯, t
∗(c¯)) ≥ [1− τ ]Πd(c¯, t(c, c¯)) + τΠd(c¯, 0), (7.3)
Πd(c, t
∗(c)) ≥ [1− τ ]Πd(c, t(c¯, c)) + τΠd(c, 0), (7.4)
Πf (c¯, t
∗(c¯)) ≥ [1− τ ]Πf (c¯, t(c¯, c)), (7.5)
Πf (c, t
∗(c)) ≥ [1− τ ]Πf (c, t(c, c¯)), (7.6)
where (7.3) and (7.4) are the domestic firm’s incentive compatibility constraints and
(7.5) and (7.6) are the foreign firm’s incentive compatibility constraints.
It remains to specify the tariffs t(c, c¯) and t(c¯, c) that are implemented if cd 6= cf
and the audit delivers inconclusive results. Since the domestic firm benefits from
higher tariffs and the foreign firm from lower tariffs, the domestic firm’s incentive
compatibility constraint (7.4) when cost is low and the foreign firm’s incentive com-
patibility constraint (7.5) when cost is high are easily satisfied by choosing an arbi-
trary tariff t(c¯, c) from the interval [t∗(c¯), t∗(c)]. From the other two constraints, a
conflict arises: To ensure incentive compatibility for the domestic firm by condition
(7.3), the tariff t(c, c¯) needs to be sufficiently low. By contrast, from the point of
view of the foreign firm’s incentive compatibility constraint (7.6), a high tariff t(c, c¯)
is preferable. However, since τ > 0, punishment tariffs are implemented with a posi-
tive probability in case a firm lies. Hence, the domestic firm’s incentive compatibility
constraint holds with strict inequality if t(c, c¯) = t∗(c¯). Thus, to ensure truth-telling
by the domestic firm, the authority can restrict attention to tariffs t(c, c¯) > t∗(c¯).
Similarly, the foreign firm’s incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with strict
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inequality if t(c, c¯) = t∗(c). Consequently, to induce truth-telling by the foreign firm,
the authority only needs to consider tariffs strictly below t∗(c). We thus conclude
that t(c, c¯) can be optimally chosen from the open interval (t∗(c¯), t∗(c)).
To determine τmin, we define the functions
Pd(t(c, c¯), τ) = Πd(c¯, t
∗(c¯))− [1− τ ]Πd(c¯, t(c, c¯))− τΠd(c¯, 0), (7.7)
Pf (t(c, c¯), τ) = Πf (c, t
∗(c))− [1− τ ]Πf (c, t(c, c¯)). (7.8)
Note that both firms’ incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied if and only
if Pd(t(c, c¯), τ) ≥ 0 and Pf (t(c, c¯), τ) ≥ 0. Furthermore, Pd is decreasing in t(c, c¯),
whereas Pf is increasing in t(c, c¯). Also, from the foregoing paragraph, Pd(t
∗(c¯), τ) > 0
and Pf (t
∗(c), τ) > 0 for all τ . All this implies that Pd and Pf can have at most one
intersection in the interval (t∗(c¯), t∗(c)). If Pd(t∗(c), τ) > Pf (t∗(c), τ), there is no
intersection. Then, by choosing t(c, c¯) = t∗(c), the full-information tariffs can be
implemented. This case occurs, if it occurs at all, if τ is sufficiently close to one. As
τ decreases, Pd and Pf as functions of t(c, c¯) shift down. At some point, we will have
Pd(t
∗(c), τ) < 0 and Pf (t∗(c¯), τ) < 0, implying that an intersection in the interval
(t∗(c¯), t∗(c)) exists. We denote this intersection, which depends on τ , by tˆ(c, c¯) and
define
Pd(tˆ(c, c¯), τ) = Pf (tˆ(c, c¯), τ) = P (τ). (7.9)
Given τ , the perfect-information tariffs can be implemented if and only if P (τ) ≥ 0.
Since Pd and Pf are increasing in τ , P (τ) is also increasing in τ . Thus, τmin is given
by P (τmin) = 0, or, equivalently,
τmin =
Πd(c¯, tˆ(c, c¯))− Πd(c¯, t∗(c¯))
Πd(c¯, tˆ(c, c¯))− Πd(c¯, 0)
=
Πf (c, tˆ(c, c¯))− Πf (c, t∗(c))
Πf (c, tˆ(c, c¯))
. (7.10)
Example 7.1. In our linear example, tˆ solves[
4a
3
− 2k + 2c¯
3
]2





+ k − 4c
3
]2
− (1− τ)(a+ k − 2c− 2tˆ)2 (7.11)
and τmin solves
τmin = 1− (a+ 3k − 4c)
2
9[a+ k − 2c− 2tˆ]2 , (7.12)
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where tˆ is a function of τmin. For example, let a = 100, c = 10, c¯ = 50, and
k = 50. The full-information tariffs are t∗ = 30 and t¯∗ = 16.667. We can calculate
tˆ(c, c¯) = 22.896 and τmin = 0.309.
Since τmin is strictly lower than one, the perfect-information tariffs may still
be implementable under imperfect auditing, provided that the auditing technology is
still sufficiently effective (τ ≥ τmin). However, since τmin > 0, it is no longer possible
to implement the perfect-information tariffs if the auditing technology is sufficiently
poor (τ < τmin). In this case, the authority has to raise t(c¯, c¯) above t
∗(c¯) and lower
t(c, c) below t∗(c).
We can summarize our findings as follows:
Proposition 7.1. Consider case 1. Suppose that t∗(c¯) < t∗(c) and auditing uncovers
the foreign firm’s true cost with probability τ ∈ (0, 1). If τ ≥ τmin defined in (7.10),
the optimal full-information tariffs t∗(c) can be implemented. If τ lies below this limit,
however, t(c, c) has to be lowered relative to t∗(c) and t(c¯, c¯) has to be increased relative
to t∗(c¯) to ensure incentive compatibility.
In case 2, the analysis of the effect that imperfect auditing has on the optimal
mechanism proceeds analogously to case 1. In section 4, we have shown that, under
perfect auditing, the authority imposes the tariffs t∗m(c) := min{t∗(c),m(c)}, where
m(c) denotes the dumping margin. Hence, in the above analysis, we just need to
replace t∗(c) by t∗m(c) and require that also the tariffs that are set when the audit does
not yield a result be at or below the dumping margin. We then receive a lower bound
on τ for which t∗m(c) is still implementable. If the auditing procedure becomes so
imprecise that t∗m(c) is no longer feasible, the maximum and minimum implemented
tariffs must be decreased and increased, respectively. In addition, increasing the
implemented tariff may not be feasible due to the dumping margin constraint, in
which case the other implemented tariff would need to be decreased more.
Now we turn to case 3 and suppose the authority wants to implement truthful
reporting by the foreign firm only, as in mechanism C.22 Here, we assume that, if
an audit is conducted but delivers no additional information, the tariff equals the
22The analysis of the case where both firms report truthfully corresponds to case 2.
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normal tariff rate t(cf ). Then, imperfect auditing has a similar effect on the optimal
mechanism as in the previously discussed cases. The result is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.2. In case 3, if only the foreign firm is made to report truthfully, the
maximum implemented tariff increases in τ , while the minimum implemented tariff
decreases.
The proof is given in the appendix.
8. conclusion
After the completion of the GATT Tokyo Round in 1979, most-favored-nation
(MFN) tariffs were further lowered (today, MFN tariff levels are quite small for most
goods, at least in developed countries). At the same time, alternative trade policy
instruments became more popular. The increased use of quotas and voluntary export
restraints after 1979 triggered the emergence of a strategic trade policy literature that
explains why authorities may want to pursue active trade policy when markets are not
perfectly competitive and why the choice of trade policy instrument often matters for
the policy outcome (non-equivalence of trade policy instruments). However, many
trade economists lost interest in the strategic trade policy argument again, partly
because the process of tariffication led to the gradual elimination of many non-tariff
barriers, and partly also because strategic trade policy “presumes too much knowledge
on the part of authorities” (Brander, 1995, p.1422).
In this paper, we have argued that the dramatic increase in antidumping pro-
tection which took place after the completion of the GATT Tokyo Round, at the
same time when a surge in non-tariff barriers could be observed, may actually be
viewed as strategic trade policy as well. But whereas the surge in non-tariff barriers
was successfully reversed (e.g., by tariffication), antidumping protection has become
more and more popular, a well-established and legal measure within the framework
of GATT/WTO rules to safeguard fair trade. We have shown that in theory, the
antidumping procedure provides a country with the necessary means to successfully
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overcome the informational problems which would usually render the design of op-
timal strategic trade policy infeasible. Moreover, depending on the degree of free-
dom the antidumping authority has in choosing the antidumping duty, the authority
may use the obtained information to also successfully implement the optimal full-
information strategic trade policy. Thus, strategic trade policy may actually be alive
and well right under the auspices of GATT/WTO.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof that if t∗(c) is decreasing, so will be t(c) in case 3 (footnote 15). The
proof is by contradiction. Suppose that, contrary to the claim, t∗(c) is decreasing in
c while t(c) is increasing, i.e., t∗(c) > t∗(c¯) but t(c) < t(c¯). First, let us rule out
t(c) < t∗(c¯). Such a tariff scheme cannot be optimal since the authority is better
off by implementing t(c) = t(c¯) = t∗(c¯) and setting θ(c) = 0 for all c. Secondly,
notice that t∗(c) < t(c¯) is not optimal, either, since the authority is better off by
implementing t(c) = t(c¯) = t∗(c) and setting θ(c) = 0 for all c. Finally, consider
t∗(c¯) ≤ t(c) < t(c¯) ≤ t∗(c). Such a scheme cannot be optimal since it is dominated
by some other scheme where t∗(c¯) ≤ t(c) = t(c¯) ≤ t∗(c) and θ(c) = 0 for all c. Thus,
when t∗(c) is decreasing in c, this must also be true for t(c). 
Proof that t∗(c¯) < tC(c¯) ≤ tC(c) < t∗(c) in Proposition 5.1. For the moment, we
disregard the constraint tmax ≥ t. Then, provided that the authority’s objective
















At the moment, we do not have an upper bound on tC and thus only know that
∂θ¯
∂t
≥ 0. Hence, from (5.10), we obtain tC ≤ t∗(c). However, since t∗(c) < tmax by
assumption and therefore tC < tmax, it must hold that
∂θ¯
∂t
is strictly positive and,
consequently, tC < t
∗(c). Thus, tC < tmax and the disregarded constraint tmax ≥ t




Consequently, condition (5.9) implies t¯C > t
∗(c¯). 
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Proof of Proposition 7.2. Let t∗(c) be decreasing in c and t∗(c) < tmax for all c.
The authority maximizes
α[W (c¯, t(c¯))− θ(c¯)M ] + (1− α)[W (c, t(c))− θ(c)M ],
subject to the constraints that for all c, c˜ with c 6= c˜
Πf (c, t(c)) ≥ [1− τθ(c˜)]Πf (c, t(c˜)) + τθ(c˜)Πf (c, t˜(c˜|c)) (A.1)
and tmax ≥ t(c), t(c˜), t˜(c˜|c). Applying the same line of argumentation as in section
5, the authority’s problem can be simplified to
max
t¯,t





Πf (c, t¯)− Πf (c, t)
Πf (c, t¯)− Πf (c, tmax) . (A.2)



















| are decreasing in τ . This shows that t¯C decreases in τ and tC
increases in τ . 
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